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USURY-COMMITMENT FEES-MAYBE YES, MAYBE NO,
BUT NOT THIS TIME. Arkansas Savings & Loan v. Mack Trucks
of Arkansas, 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
On March 1, 1974, Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Armond Smith,
and Shirley G. Smith executed a note secured by a mortgage to the
Arkansas Savings and Loan Association of North Little Rock, Ar-
kansas. The principal amount of the note was $340,000 with interest
thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum. On March 5, 1974,
Arkansas Savings, by way of a bookkeeping entry, credited this
amount to Mack Trucks and the Smiths.' Arkansas Savings then
made certain disbursements out of the loan proceeds. Among these
was a $3,400 charge labeled a "service charge" credited to Arkansas
Savings on March 6, 1974.
Mack Trucks and the Smiths defaulted on the note, and Arkan-
sas Savings brought suit in the Pulaski County chancery court to
foreclose the mortgage. The Smiths asserted the defense of usury.
They offered testimony that in March of 1974 Arkansas Savings &
Loan was charging one percent in addition to the quoted interest on
almost every loan it made.2 They further argued that the $3,400
labeled a "service charge" amounted to additional interest and
when added to the stipulated rate of nine percent, the interest on
the note exceeded the ten percent Arkansas constitutional limita-
tion. Despite the fact that it was recorded in several places in the
lender's records solely as a service charge, Arkansas Savings con-
tended that the $3,400 fee was a legitimate "commitment fee"4
charged to Mack Trucks and the Smiths for its $340,000 loan com-
mitment. 5 The Chancellor sustained the usury defense ahd dis-
1. Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 42-43, Arkansas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack
Trucks of Ark. Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
2. Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 56, Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks
of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
3. The parties stipulated that Arkansas Savings charged interest in the amount of
$13,653.74. This amount did not include the $3,400 fee. If the $3,400 was interest, then the
total interest charged for the year was $17,053.74 or $2,028.92 above 10%. Arkansas Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 267, 566 S.W.2d 128, 130 (1978).
4. Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 55-56, Arkansas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack
Trucks of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
5. See Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Law, 16 Bus. LAWYER, 181 (Nov., 1960);
Mitchell, Usury in Arkansas, 26 ARK. L. REv. 263 (1972). A commitment fee in its purest form
works as an option. The borrower reserves money for a certain period of time at a certain rate
of interest. For this "option", the lender charges a fee. The borrower is free to seek financing
elsewhere if he can find better terms. On the other hand, a service charge represents a
somewhat broader concept. Extra charges for money or forbearance might include anything
from a fee for a credit report as in Winston v. Personal Finance Co., 220 Ark. 580, 249 S.W.2d
315 (1952), to fees paid to a broker if that broker is acting as the borrower's agent, Altschul
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missed the complaint with the exception of $3,429.65. Arkansas
Savings had paid this amount for taxes and hazard insurance and
the Chancellor found these payments had benefited all parties.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, citing an earlier deci-
sion which held that a "moneylender cannot impose upon the bor-
rower charges that in fact constitute the lender's overhead ekpenses
or costs of doing business."' The court considered the $3,400 charge
to be interest and the transaction of March 6, 1974, to be no more
than a discount or the taking of interest in advance. Arkansas Sav-
ings & Loan Association v. Mack Trucks of Arkansas, 263 Ark. 264,
566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
Basic to understanding usury law in Arkansas is a grasp of the
terminology and canons that surround the law. One writer has con-
cluded that perhaps the most frequent statement to be found in
usury cases is that a court will look beyond the device or label in
determining whether a transaction is in fact usurious.7 In making
such a determination, Arkansas courts rely on the facts and circum-
stances existing at the instant the contract is consummated.'
While the word "interest" is not statutorily defined in Arkan-
sas, it has been fairly well established that interest is the price paid
by a borrower to a lender for the use of what he borrows? The term
''usury" is ordinarily defined as an excessive charge for a loan or
forbearance of money.' 0 Article 19, Section 13 of the Arkansas Con-
stitution declares: "All contracts for a greater rate of interest than
ten percent per annum shall be void as to principal and interest
. . ." If interest exceeds ten percent, a lender cannot collect either
principal or interest. The General Assembly has, under this consti-
tutional mandate, prohibited usury."
Some money lenders in Arkansas have tried to avoid the pen-
alty mandated by the 1874 Constitution by attempting to find
loopholes in the constitutional declaration and its supporting stat-
utes' 2 rather than by restricting the interest they charged.' 3 Courts
v. Martin, 227 Ark. 816, 301 S.W.2d 571 (1957). Mitchell, in his article, reports that Arkansas
law has always allowed lenders to make certain extra charges without having them added to
and computed as interest.
6. Sosebee v. Boswell, 242 Ark. 396, 400, 414 S.W.2d 380, 382 (1967).
7. Collins & Ham, The Usury Law of Arkansas: A Study in Evasion, 8 ARK. L. REV.
399, 419 (1954).
8. Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 469, 308 S.W.2d 802, 806 (1957).
9. Miles v. Gordon, 234 Ark. 525, 529, 353 S.W.2d 157, 160 (1962).
10. Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Knight, 237 Ark. 802, 803, 376 S.W.2d 556, 557 (1964).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-601 et. seq. (1957).
12. Collins & Ham, supra note 7, at 401.
13. Shortly before the adoption of this constitutional provision of 1874, a reasonable
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for a time were reluctant to construe the ten percent limitation
strictly4 and, because the penalty was so severe, undertook to soften
its impact by sanctioning a number of evasion techniques." Lenders
were able to exclude from interest such items as inspection fees
6
and compulsory insurance.' 7 The Arkansas Supreme Court also re-
fused to apply the usury limitation to a bona fide sale of goods on
credit."s
It is important to note that even during this period of leniency,
the court never permitted sham transactions as an avoidance de-
vice. 9 For example, in Cammack v. Runyan Creamery,20 the bor-
rower was required to hire the lender as an "advisor" on financial
affairs. The evidence showed that the lender did nothing to earn its
fee and the court invalidated the borrower's obligation.2'
During the 1950's, this "leniency" trend was reversed in a series
of cases wherein the Arkansas Supreme Court invalidated as usu-
rious practices it previously had sanctioned. In the first of these
decisions, Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 2 the seller of an
automobile and a loan company which financed the sale attempted
to charge the purchaser a principal amount in excess of the quoted
price, in addition to interest. The practice of allowing a seller to
charge a greater price for a credit sale than for a sale made for cash
had been one of the earliest devices used by Arkansas lenders to
avoid the usury limitation.2 3 The Arkansas Supreme Court found no
fault with the right of a seller to ask one price where cash was paid,
and a higher price if credit was extended.2 4 In Schuck, however, the
seller had not informed the buyer of the difference between the cash
price and the price to be extracted through time payments. In addi-
rate of interest was considered to be about 24% per annum and it was not unusual to find
borrowers paying 60% per annum. Penick, The Impact of Usury Law on Banks in Arkansas,
8 ARK. L. REv. 420, 423 (1954) (citing W.B. WORTHEN, EARLY BANKING IN ARKANSAS (1906)).
14. Mitchell, Usury in Arkansas, 26 ARK. L. Rev. 263 (1972).
15. Id.
16. Lyttle v. Matthews Inv. Co., 193 Ark. 849, 103 S.W.2d 47 (1937).
17. Matthews v. Georgia State Say. Ass'n, 132 Ark. 219, 225, 200 S.W. 130, 132 (1918).
18. General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Holland, 196 Ark. 675, 119 S.W.2d 535 (1938);
Harper v.. Futrell, 204 Ark. 822, 164 S.W.2d 995 (1942).
19. Collins & Ham, supra note 7, at 418.
20. 175 Ark. 601, 299 S.W. 1023 (1927).
21. Collins and Ham in their article cite to a case that reaches an opposite result-Cain
v. Stacy, 146 Ark. 55, 225 S.W. 18 (1920) (contract of employment as prerequisite to loan held
valid where these services were actually needed and performed). Cain, however, is clearly
distinguishable from Cammack in that the fee was earned.
22. 220 Ark. 56, 247 S.W.2d 1 (1952).
23. Collins & Ham, supra note 7, at 401.
24. Schuck v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 220 Ark. 56, 61, 247 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1952).
[Vol. 2
NOTES
tion, there was evidence that the seller was not an independent
actor, but rather the agent of the finance company. The Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded upon these facts that the failure to dis-
close a credit price was fatal to any "time-price differential" defense
that the lender might raise. The court viewed the difference between
the two prices as an add-on which was an unauthorized charge
devised to evade usury and as such made the contract usurious.
The Arkansas Supreme Court clarified Schuck in Hare v. Gen-
eral Contract Purchase Corp. 25 Recognizing that a long line of cases
had held it permissible to charge a greater price for goods in a credit
sale, the court stated that these precedents could no longer be relied
upon.?' The court pointed out that any valid distinction between
buying at a credit price and buying at a cash price had largely
disappeared and such time-price differentials were only serving as
a cloak for usury in many cases. The court issued a caveat:
(1) We leave unimpaired the doctrine that a seller may, in a bona
fide transaction, increase the price to compensate for the risk that
is involved in a credit sale. But there may be a question of fact as
to whether the so-called credit price was bona fide as such, or only
a cloak for usury.2
In the next decade, the Arkansas Supreme Court made it clear
that the court had initiated a policy of strictly construing the Arkan-
sas usury law. Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co.21 turned back a
legislative attempt to allow specific charges to be excluded from
interest. The court held Act 203 of 1951, the Arkansas Installment
Loan Law," unconstitutional because it would permit illegal inter-
est to be extracted in the form of a service charge. In 1954 and 1957
the courts broadened its prohibitions to include more than just com-
mercial lenders.3 Strict construction, however, did not mean that
all charges imposed by a lender would be considered interest. 3' In
25. 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
26. Id. at 609, 249 S.W.2d at 977.
27. Id. at 609, 249 S.W.2d at 978.
28. 220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d 307 (1952).
29. In 1951, the legislature passed what purported to be a model small loans act allow-
ing certain lenders, if qualified, to make loans up to $2,500 and to extract charges for interest,
various types of insurance, and service fees. The act authorized the lender to require the
purchase of life and health insurance to protect the loan, and permitted the lender to charge
to each borrower his proportionate amount of the lender's overhead. Collins & Ham, supra
note 7, at 412-13.
30. See Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957); O'Brien
v. Atlas Finance Co., 223 Ark. 176, 264 S.W.2d 839 (1954).
31. Lockhart v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 252 Ark. 878, 481 S.W.2d 350 (1972).
19791
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Lockhart v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,3 2 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court identified certain collateral charges that would not be
considered interest. The court recognized the propriety of such
charges as property inspection fees, 33 expenses for an abstract of
title,3 insurance premiums paid to a third party,
35 recording fees, 3
and title insurance premiums .3 These charges benefit the lender,
but the Arkansas Supreme Court characterized these transactions
as being reasonable in amount, made in good faith, and representing
reimbursements made to third persons.38 In Sosebee v. Boswell,3 the
court identified two principles it would consider in determining
whether charges amounted to interest. "First, any profit extracted
by the lender must be treated as interest if it depends upon a contin-
gency not within the control of the debtor."40 And second, the money
lender could not impose upon the borrower charges that in fact
"constitute[d] the lender's . . . costs of doing business."'"
In Harris v. Guaranty Financial Corp., 4 2 the court defined other
factors relevant to a determination of whether a charge amounted
to interest. 3 One factor was whether a particular charge was for the
sole benefit of the lender or for the mutual benefit of both the lender
and the borrower. Another element was whether the charges re-
ceived by the lender were disbursed to a third party for services
rendered in the loan procedure or were pocketed by the lender and
applied to his business overhead.
44
The first of these elements was present in Key v. Worthen Bank
& Trust Company, N.A.45 The holder of two bank credit cards
brought suit to void as usurious contracts which required the card-
holder to pay an annual membership fee in each credit plan. The
32. Id. at 880, 481 S.W.2d at 351.
33. Winston v. Personal Finance Co., 220 Ark. 580, 584, 249 S.W.2d 315, 317 (1952).
34. Brown v. Fretz, 189 Ark. 411, 414, 72 S.W.2d 765, 766 (1934).
35. Ragge v. Bryan, 249 Ark. 164, 171, 458 S.W.2d 403, 408 (1970).
36. Brown v. Fretz, 189 Ark. 411, 414, 72 S.W.2d 765, 766 (1934).
37. Harris v. Guaranty Financial Corp., 244 Ark. 218, 224, 424 S.W.2d 355, 358 (1968).
38. Lockhart v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 252 Ark. 878, 880, 481 S.W.2d 350,
351 (1972).
39. 242 Ark. 396, 414 S.W.2d 380, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967).
40. Id. at 399, 414 S.W.2d at 382.
41. Id. at 400, 414 S.W.2d at 382.
42. 244 Ark. 218, 424 S.W.2d 355 (1968).
43. Harris also held that whether a particular charge was proper depended upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. The court found determinations of this nature were
questions of fact.
44. Harris v. Guaranty Financial Corp., 244 Ark. 218, 223, 424 S.W.2d 355, 357-58
(1968).
45. 260 Ark. 725, 543 S.W.2d 496 (1976).
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cardholder claimed that the twelve dollar annual charge when
added to the ten percent interest on her balance exceeded the con-
stitutional limitation. The court, in holding that the charge was not
interest, relied on the fact that the plaintiff was not a necessitous
borrower, who, as a prerequisite to a loan, was forced to purchase
something." More importantly, the charge was incidental to the
extension of credit and provided the cardholder with a number of
collateral benefits such as check-cashing and identification, and
also obviated the necessity of carrying large amounts of cash. Rely-
ing on two earlier decisions," the court held that: "contracts or fees
collateral to the lending or borrowing of money, if in themselves
lawful and made in good faith, do not infect the 'borrowing transac-
tion' with usury, although their effect may be to increase the sum
payable from the borrower to the lender.""
The question of whether commitment fees are non-usurious col-
lateral charges has not been decided by the Arkansas Supreme
Court49 or by many courts in other states. 0 One writer views this
absence of cases as an indication that few courts would hold that a
fee paid for an advance commitment to make a mortgage loan
should be considered as interest in the calculation of whether the
46. The court stated that the fee was not imposed in connection with receiving a loan
from Worthen or with any specific extension of credit. Mrs. Key had come to the bank
voluntarily seeking membership in specific bank plans. Further, the applications for the cards
stated that the applicant understood the fee was required whether or not she used "the bank
card for the purpose of obtaining credit." Key v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 260 Ark.
725, 730, 543 S.W.2d 496, 499 (1976).
47. Commercial Credit Plan v. Chandler, 218 Ark. 966, 239 S.W.2d 1009 (1951) and
Leavitt v. Marathon Oil Co., 186 Ark. 1077, 57 S.W.2d 814 (1933).
48. Key v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 260 Ark. 725, 730, 543 S.W.2d 496, 499
(1976).
49. The subject of a commitment fee was abruptly treated in Sosebee v. Boswell, 242
Ark. 396, 414 S.W.2d 380, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967), in which a commitment fee was
charged and dicta indicated it would be interest. It was stipulated, however, that upon the
facts there involved the charge was interest and the Arkansas Supreme Court did not decide
whether commitment fees were to be considered additional interest or not.
50. Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant by Central Arkansas Bank Clearing House Asso-
ciation at 10-11, Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566
S.W.2d 128 (1978), lists seven cases which touch upon the subject: Altherr v. Wilshire Mort-
gage Corp., 104 Ariz. 59, 64-65, 448 P.2d 859, 864-65 (1968); Daily Mines Co. v. Catalina
Consol. Copper Co., 59 Ariz. 149, 155-57, 124 P.2d 320, 323 (1942); Financial Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Burleigh House Inc., 305 So.2d 59, 62-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1042 (1977); D & M Dev. Co. v. Sherwood & Roberts, Inc., 93 Idaho 200, 457 P.2d 439,
445-46 (1969); Pivot City Realty Co. v. State Sav. & Trust Co., 88 Ind. App. 222, 229-30, 162
N.E. 27, 29 (1928); Paley v. Barton Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 82 N.J. Super. 75, 81, 196 A.2d 682,
685 (1964), cert. denied, 41 N.J. 602, 198 A.2d 446 (1964); Gonzales County Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976). In all of these cases, the decision or diftum has
stated that the commitment fee in question was not interest.
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total charges were usurious. 5'
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Mack Trucks held that the
$3,400 Arkansas Savings disbursed to itself on March 6, regardless
of the label that was placed upon it, amounted to no more than the
taking of interest in advance. The court reasoned that the charge
was made on all Arkansas Savings loans regardless of the type of
loan involved or whether the lender provided a benefit collateral to
the extension of credit. The practice represented no more than the
collection from the borrower of a part of the lender's expense of
doing business. Sosebee had explicitly condemned a charge of this
kind as usurious. The court reasoned that if the charge was not a
payment for overhead, then it had no basis."2 The court decided that
because there was no legitimate basis, the fee was an unjustified
service charge which the lower court properly included as interest
under the note.
In Mack Trucks, the Arkansas Supreme Court has placed a
cloud over the charging of commitment fees in the State of Arkan-
sas. The court declined to distinguish the fee charged by Arkansas
Savings from a true commitment fee. This affects the ability and
willingness of lenders within the state to commit themselves to loan
money at a future date for a fixed rate of interest, a commitment
collateral to the actual transfer of funds."
It is significant to note that the court did not rule out valid
commitment fees, but rather condemned the particular transaction
that was involved.54 However, by using broad language and failing
51. Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Law, 16 Bus. LAWYER 181, 188 (1960).
52. Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 59, Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks
of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978). In the lower court, Arkansas Savings' senior
vice-president had testified that none of the $3,400 charge could be attributed to services
other than the setting aside of funds.
53. Loan commitments play an essential role in the construction industry. The commit-
ment assures the interest parties of the availability and the cost of long term financing. The
commitment of funds also may play a vital role in a wide variety of business arrangements.
The importance of commitment fees was underscored by the conclusion drawn in the Amicus
Curiae Brief for Appellant by the Central Arkansas Bank Clearing House Association at 16:
"[tihe loan commitment is such an accepted and vital ingredient in major commercial
transactions that it is difficult to list every type of transaction in which loan commitments
could be involved."
54. Abstract and Brief of Appellant, vol.1, at 5, Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack
Trucks of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978). On August 23, 1974, Mack Trucks
and the Smiths paid Arkansas Savings by check another $3,400 for a certain commitment
letter. The parties stipulated that this payment with its surrounding circumstances was not
an interest charge on the note. The court pointed out that this second payment was appar-
ently for permanent financing, but would make no ruling as to whether this charge was




to distinguish the charge in this case from a true commitment fee,
the court has caused confusion.
To clarify its decision, the court might have pointed to various
factors that would distinguish the charge made by Arkansas Savings
from a true commitment fee. Mack Trucks had no option as to
whether to take out or forego the loan and received no collateral
benefit for the charge.55 In addition, there was no evidence that the
borrower was ever advised of the charge until closing. Moreover, the
charge was paid after the transfer of funds to Mack Trucks' account
and not in advance of the time of closing. And although the court
has held that labels will not rule the transaction," the charge ap-
peared in the lender's records as a service charge and not a commit-
ment fee.
The court in the past has recognized that lenders who confer
additional benefits could charge fees separate and apart from inter-
est paid for the use of money. It would appear that a true commit-
ment fee would fit within this classification. The fee in Mack Trucks
was a charge that was extracted from almost every borrower and did
not support any legitimate collateral benefit. Although a true com-
mitment fee was not involved, the court nevertheless missed an
opportunity to clarify for lenders some of the necessary characteris-
tics of true commitment fees. The court might thus have prevented
unnecessary future litigation.
One member of the Arkansas Supreme Court has shown an
awareness of the problem created by Mack Trucks. Note should be
taken of the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Carleton Harris
upon denial of a petition for a rehearing in the case.5" In his opinion,
the Chief Justice recognized a distinction between the fee in Mack
Trucks and a true commitment fee and emphasized that important
questions had been left unanswered by the majority opinion. He
issued a caveat, however, that lenders should not rely on the opinion
of a single justice.
Michael E. Wheeler
55. Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 60, Arkansas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks
of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566 S.W.2d 128 (1978).
56. See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
57. Arkansas Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 271, 566
S.W.2d 128, 132 (1978).
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